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Abstract:   
As evidence accumulates to expose the ineffectiveness of foreign aid, there are 
increasing calls for rich countries to open up their immigration policies so as to enable 
migrants’ remittances to substitute for foreign aid as a growth-stimulant in poor, migrant-
sending countries. In this paper, we use an endogenous growth model to argue that the 
growth effects of transnational migration and remittances are entirely mediated by the 
human capital profile of emigrants, as determined by immigration policy at the 
destination country. Quantitatively, we find that when immigration policy at the 
destination country provokes a “brain drain”, growth is negatively impacted in the 
sending country despite remittances. The reverse is true when immigration policy targets 
workers with low levels of human capital. 
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I. Introduction
Empirical data reveals that globalization of the world’s economies has been characterized
by rising migration flows from less-developed to developed countries.4 Up to the 1950s,
international migration had its main source in Europe. Since then, however, the pattern of
international migration flows has undergone a radical change, with the developing world,
including the poorest countries, emerging as its predominant source (Beine, Docquier, and
Rapoport, 2008). This phenomenon has be accompanied by a steady surge in transna-
tional remittances from emigrants to relatives and friends worldwide. Money sent home by
migrant workers now exceed foreign aid (Kapur and McHale, 2003), representing the sec-
ond largest financial inflow to many developing countries, behind foreign direct investment
(Ratha, 2003).5 These observations have triggered a growing economic literature interested
in the socioeconomic eﬀects migration and remittances may have on the migrant-sending
countries.
From a development policy standpoint, growing interest in remittances stems from
their perceived potential as catalysts of development. As evidence accumulates to expose
the ineﬀectiveness of foreign aid, there are increasing calls for rich countries to open up
their immigration policies so as to enable migrants’ remittances to substitute for foreign
aid as a growth-stimulant in poor, migrant-sending countries. Indeed, unlike foreign aid,
remittance flows put no burden on rich countries taxpayers (Kapur, 2004). Unlike foreign
aid which often falls in the hand of elites with extensive economic and political power
and little consideration for the wellbeing of the poor majority (Angeles and Neanidis,
2008), remittance flows go directly to the poor households who need it. In that sense,
they may represent a viable alternative to foreign aid as a poverty alleviation mechanism.
However, remittance flows can be limited by immigration policy in rich countries. With
4United Nations (2002), International Migration Report, New York.
5Latest estimates vary between US $401 billion published by the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD) and the more conservative figures of US$250 billion published by the World Bank in
2006 . However there is a consensus among these two sources of data that these figures are increasing by
almost 30% annually. Remittances sent back to developing countries, for example, rose from $116 billion
in 2006 to $240 billion in 2007 (Ratha et al. 2007).
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ineﬀective foreign aid having cost rich countries’ taxpayers around $2.3 trillion over the
past five decades (Easterly, 2007), many have come to support the view that a more open
immigration policy from rich countries can promote development in poor, migrant-sending
countries. This paper assesses the merits of this view by exploring the growth eﬀects of
transnational remittances by emigrants.
The fundamental premises of our migration and remittance model are the following:
(1). Migrating to a richer economy and remitting to a child dependent left in the migrant
sending-country are joint decisions by forward-looking agents. These agents decide
on their children level of human capital, while accounting for forgone income from
child labor sources.
(2). Migrant remittances are a source of financing for children’s consumption needs, en-
abling them to delay participation in the child labor market, thus extending their
school enrolment. In other words, remittances help fight child labor, by promoting
school enrolment.6
(3). The quality of education in the migrant-sending country is a determinant of the future
human capital level of a school-goer.
(4). The human capital profile of migrant workers is influenced by the immigration policy
of the destination country.
The first, second and third premises are essentially what distinguishes our analysis from
the existing literature on brain drain (e.g. Rapoport, 2002; Stark, 2003; Fan and Stark,
6Indeed a vast literature analyzes the impact of migration or remittances on the accumulation of human
capital. Migration is an incentive to increasing human capital (Vidal, 1997). Rapoport and Docquier
(2005) show that remittances can impact positively the level of education of children whose households
have an emigrant member. Hanson and Woodruﬀ (2002) find that children from households with at least an
emigrant member are likely to complete more years of schooling in Mexico. According to Cox Edwards and
Ureta (2003), remittances contribute significatively to the reduction of the dropout likelihood of children
in Salvadore. When Yang (2003) has analyzed the impact of remittances on Filipino he found that a raise
in remittances of 10% of the initial income increases the fraction of children aged 17 to 21 attending school
by more than 10% points. And according to Lopez Cordova (2004), if the share of international remittances
received rises of 5%, begining at zero, school attendance increases more than 3% in Mexico.
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2007; Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2008), while the fourth premise provides a basis for
exploring the mediation eﬀect of immigration policy in destination countries. We derive
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for transnational migrations and remittance flows to
enhance the accumulation of human capital, modeled as the engine of economic growth
in the migrant-sending country. Our theory confirms the predictions of existing theories
that transnational migrations have (i) a positive eﬀect on parental remittances, and (ii)
a negative eﬀect on child labor. However, unlike the existing literature (e.g. Rapoport,
2002; Stark, 2003; Fan and Stark, 2007; Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2008), we find
that the growth eﬀects of transnational migration and remittance flows are mediated by
the human capital profile of emigrants— as determined by the immigration policy at the
destination country. Using the no-migration equilibrium as a benchmark, we show that
when immigration policy at the destination country provokes a "brain drain", growth is
negatively impacted in the sending country. The reverse is true when immigration policy
targets less-educated migrants. These contrasting results have an intuitive explanation. To
the extent education is the main mechanism of human capital accumulation, the quality of
that education is an important determinant of parents’ decision to invest in their oﬀspring’s
human capital. As teachers in the migrant-sending country are hired from the pool of non-
emigrant adults, the quality of education provided is impacted by the average human capital
of these teachers. When there is an uncompensated brain drain, average human capital
of non-emigrants decreases, causing a decline in the quality of education. For altruistic
parents, the decline in education quality raises the opportunity cost of school-enrolment
for children in an environment where schooling and child labor have competing claims on a
child’s time. Consequently, parents end up investing less in their children’s human capital
formation, and growth of the economy-wide average human capital is adversely aﬀected.
In contrast, when emigration is a phenomenon of the less educated, hired teachers in the
sending country are more-qualified, and the quality of education is higher, causing altruistic
parents to remit more, so as to help their oﬀspring accumulate more human capital.
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II. Literature Review
Our paper bridges a number of important branches of the economic literature, namely
the growth and development literature, the migration and remittances literature, and the
child labor literature. Individually, these branches have made significant advances in the
understanding of the development process. In the growth and development literature, a
seminal work by Schultz (1962) formalizes investment in human capital as an important
determinant of an economy’s growth performance. Lucas (1988), Barro (1993), and Lee
(1993) formalize this same relationship in models of endogenous growth, by emphasizing
the dynamics between education, training and growth. Azariadis and Drazen (1990) illus-
trate the importance of intergenerational transfers of human capital in the development
of human resources. Using a growth model with endogenous fertility, Becker, Murphy
and Tamura (1990) formalize the existence of under-development traps arising from the
arbitrage altruistic parents make between increasing household’s size and improving the
well-being of each its members. Our paper contributes to this branch of the development
literature by exploring the joint eﬀects of emigration and remittances7 on human capital
and growth in the migrant-sending country.
In the migration and remittances literature, empirical evidence on the development
eﬀects of transnational remittance flows is mixed. While a number of studies find confir-
mation for the hypothesis that remittance flows have a positive eﬀect on economic develop-
ment, others are less optimistic. Proponents of the positive eﬀect contend that remittance
flows decrease inequality in the recipient countries (Docquier, Rapoport, and Shen, 2007),
enable household to relieve budget constraints, and stimulate demand of goods and ser-
vices, which, in turn, stimulate production and employment (Stark, Taylor and Yitzenaki,
1986, 1988; Taylor, 1992; Taylor and Wyatt, 1996; Lowell and de la Garza, 2000). More-
over, Quibria (1997), Taylor (1999), and Ratha (2003) argue that remittance flows provide
the much needed currency for importing essential inputs that are unavailable domestically,
7Transnational remittances are individual transferts of money from immigrants to beneficiaries (friends,
and family members, etc.) living in their native countries.
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as well as additional savings for financing economic development. Pessimism about the
positive eﬀect of remittance flows has two main sources. Firstly, remittance flows may gen-
erate a level of domestic demand that exceeds the economy’s production capacity, and thus
may represent a source of inflation (Adams, 1991), or unemployment, if cheaper imports
are brought in to expunge the remittance-induced excess demand.8 Secondly, given the
income eﬀect of remittance flows, recipients could aﬀord to work less. The resulting de-
crease in labor supply, in turn, may lead to a negative eﬀect of on economic growth (Chami
et al., 2003). We complement this branch of the development literature by exploring the
growth eﬀects of remittance flows in a broader perspective of endogenous migration and
remittance theory. As determinants of growth, both migration and remittances have been
extensively studied by economists. But most existing works, both empirical and theoreti-
cal, either treat them separately (Fiess and Verner, 2003; Rapoport and Katz, 2005; Stark
and Fan, 2007; Rapoport and Docquier, 2007; Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport, 2008 ), or
when treated jointly (e.g., McCormick and Wahba, 2000; Docquier, Rapoport, and Shen,
2007), their growth implications are not discussed. We oﬀer a unified treatment of mi-
gration, remittance flows and growth in the migrant-sending country, highlighting the role
played by immigration policy at the destination country in mediating the growth eﬀects of
migration and remittance flows.
Our research also contributes to the development literature on parental investment in
child’s human capital. Most contributions in this branch highlights the trade-oﬀ between
the current benefits of child labor to poor households, and its future costs in terms of
low levels of human capital for children, when they become adults. Basu and Van (1998),
Baland and Robinson (2000), Dessy and Pallage (2001), Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), and
Dessy and Knowles (2008) are some of the important theoretical contributions to this child
labor literature. We build around this literature by emphasizing transnational migration
and remittance flows as a strategy for combatting child labor.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the setup, and char-
8The price for agricultural land rose between 1980 and 1986 by 600% due to
remittances (Adams, 1991)
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acterizes the intertemporal equilibrium. Section 4 solves a numerical example. Concluding
remarks are presented in Section 5. Finally, proofs of some results are provided in the
Appendix section.
III. Setup
Consider two economies, North (N) and South (S). Both produce a tradable good. North is
a rich economy, while South is a poorer one. Therefore, North may become the destination
of economic migrants from South. South is initially populated by a continuum one of agents,
each endowed with a level of human capital, h, drawn from a distribution characterized by
a CDF function:
Ψ (h) = 1
∆h
¡
h− η
¢
, (III.1)
where ∆h = η¯− η and Ψ (h) denotes the measure of parents with a human capital level no
greater than h ∈ [η, η¯], with 0 < η < η¯ < ∞.9 In this environment, an agent is an adult
with one period left to live. Each adult is parent to a two-period-lived, unique, child. Each
child is endowed with one unit of time. A child’s time endowment is allocated between
schooling and work. Henceforth we refer to all adult agents as parents.
Parents who emigrate to North leave their children behind. These children become
recipient of parental remittances. Parents make all the decisions in this environment. They
each decide whether or not to emigrate to North (N); depending on their location, how
much to remit to their child dependent, and how much labor time their child is to supply
to the market. Parental remittances are a source of financing for the child’s consumption.
A child may supplement parental remittances with income from child labor so as to finance
his consumption.
Let m be a binary variable representing the migration decision of a parent: m = N if
9Even though we do not believe that human capital is necessarily uniformly distributed in any or
all developing countries, we make this assumption for two simple reasons. First, our analysis is not
specifically concerned with the measurement of inequality per se. Second, it will gives a convenient device
for computing the measure of parents who migrate to North, as well as the measure of those who remain
in South.
6
he decides to emigrate to North and m = S, if otherwise. A non-emigrant parent earns
a level of income, ωSh, which is proportional to his/her level of human capital, where ωm
denotes the wage rate in country m ∈ {N,S}. By contrast, migration entails a cost to
the migrant in the destination country. This cost may reflect the forgone income from
restrictions placed by the destination country on migrants’ participation in the domestic
labor market. These restrictions aﬀect the level of the migrant’s total earnings in the host
economy.
Let i ∈ {1, 2} denotes immigration policy in North. When i = 1, immigration policy is
biased in favor of more educated migrants. When i = 2, it is biased toward the less educated
instead.10 A parent who elects to migrate to North earns an income, [h− ϕi (h,Ei)]ωN ,
where ϕi (h,Ei)ωN denotes the forgone income from restrictions imposed by the recipient
country on migrants’ participation in the labor market, and Ei ∈ [0, 1], the number of
migrants when immigration policy at destination is i ∈ {1, 2}. We model emigration costs
as follows:
ϕi (h,Ei) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
α1E1 + κ1 i = 1
α2E2h+ κ2h2 i = 2
(III.2)
where h denotes the human capital level of the emigrant, and αi > 0 and κi > 0 are
exogenously given parameters.
A. Preferences and Budget Constraints
Conditional upon his place of employment, m, a parent makes joint-decisions about own-
consumption (cm), the amount of money, θm, to remit to his/her unique child, and the
fraction of time, em, this child is to spend receiving an education. Education quality in
10Empirical evidence on the pattern of immigration bias is quite mixed. On one hand, there is evidence
that emigration in Eastern-European and South-American countries exhibits relatively low brain drain
levels even though out-migration rates are very high (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006). Moreover, in Mexico,
Cameroon, Zambia and Slovakia skilled migrants represent only around 15% of total migrants. On the
other hand, there is also evidence that skilled migrants account for 83,6% of total migrants in Haiti, 52%
in Sierra Leone, and 47% in Ghana.
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South is proxied by the average human capital of non-emigrant parents:
ehi = Hi
1− Ei
where
Hi =
Z
DiS
hψ (h) dh (III.3)
denotes the aggregate stock of human capital of non-emigrants, DiS the set from which non-
emigrants draw their human capital levels, and Ei the total number of parent emigrants,
when immigration policy at destination is i.
All parents have identical preferences over own-consumption (cm), child’s consumption
(ckm), and the child’s human capital level when parent (h0m). Assume a simple additively
separable utility specification of these preferences:
Um = ln (cm) + γ
£
ln ckm + β lnh0m
¤
, (III.4)
where cm denotes the level of consumption of an parent who resides and works in country
m ∈ {N,S}, γ ∈ R+ the level of parental altruism, and β ∈ (0, 1), a time discounting
factor. Schooling is the only mechanism for accumulating human capital. A child who
spends a fraction, e, of his time endowment receiving an education ends up accumulating
a level of human capital, h0m, given by:
h0m = λemehi + εh (III.5)
where λ > 1 represents an exogenous eﬃciency parameter, and εh the level of human
capital a child inherited from his parent whose level of human capital is h, with ε ∈ (0, 1).
A parent who makes the migration decision m allocates his/her income to the financing
of own consumption, and remittance flows to his oﬀspring. His/Her budget constraint thus
is:
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Pmcm + θm ≤ ym, m = N,S (III.6)
where
ym =
⎧
⎨
⎩
[h− ϕi (h,Ei)]ωN if m = N
ωSh if m = S
, (III.7)
Pm, the domestic price of the tradable good. Since in South children do not migrate, a
child’s consumption satisfies the following budget constraint:
PSckm ≤ θm + (1− em)ωk, (III.8)
where (1− em)ωk denotes income from child labor sources, and ωk, the child labor wage.
B. Production and Trade
Firms are perfectly competitive in both the output and the input markets. In North,
the production technology is given by YN = LN , where LN denotes eﬀective labor (which
equals human capital times the time spent delivering it to firms). A parent who emigrates
to North will earn a wage given by
ωN = PN (III.9)
In South, production of the tradable is carried out by both formal and informal firms.
The representative formal firm uses a quantity LS of eﬀective labor to produce a level of
output, YS, given by:
Y FS = (1− b)LS, (III.10)
where
LS ≤ Hi, (III.11)
Hi the aggregate stock of human capital of non-emigrants, when immigration policy in
North is given by i ∈ {1, 2}, and b ∈ (0, 1) a measure of the level of institutional barriers to
riches prevailing in South. These barriers may reflect, for example, the extent of corruption
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or other institutional bottlenecks prevailing in South, and which induce firms to adopt low-
productivity technologies.11 We interpret b as a measure of the degree of poverty in South.
Perfectly competitive hiring of eﬀective labor implies that
ωS = (1− b)PS (III.12)
The representative informal firm hires raw child labor, Lk, to produce a level, Yk, of
the tradable given by:
Yk = φLk, (III.13)
where φ ∈ (0, 1) denotes labor productivity in the informal sector,
Lk ≤
Z
DiS
(1− eS)ψ (h) dh+
Z
DiN
(1− eN)ψ (h) dh, (III.14)
and DiS (respectively, DiN) is the set from non-emigrants (respectively, emigrants) draw
their human capital levels when immigration policy in North is given by i ∈ {1, 2}. Per-
fectly competitive hiring of child labor implies that
ωk = Psφ. (III.15)
In the absence of migration and trade, it is assumed that North is relatively more
endowed in eﬀective labor than South. In the opening of trade and migration, North
will export the tradable while South will import it. In equilibrium, flows of migrants’
remittances to South and payments of imports by consumers in South will balanced out
to close the system, so that PS = PN . Henceforth, without loss of generality, we set
PS = PN = 1.
11According to the World Bank Doing Business 2009 Report, most countries with a higher cost of doing
business are located in the developing world.
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C. The Timing of Event
Events in this environment occur according to the following timing.
• In the beginning, North announces its permanent immigration policy i ∈ {1, 2} .
• Then, at the start of every period, each agent from South makes his migration deci-
sion, m.
• Those who chose m = N , in total number, Ei, then migrate to North.
• Next, emigrants (in total number, Ei) and non-emigrants (in total number 1 − Ei)
supply human capital to firms in their respective locations.
• Given their respective locations, they then decide on their child’s time allocation.
• Production of the tradable good then takes place, wages are paid, and agents (i.e.,
the parents) remit to their child dependent.
• Immediately after that, the consumption good is imported, and consumption takes
place in both North and South.
• Finally, parents exit, children become parents, each with one child, and another cycle
of agents decisions starts.
D. Parents’ Decision Problems
Parents in South are forward-looking. Their decision problems can thus be solved by
applying the backward induction process. This process is explained as follows. First,
as parental utility is strictly increasing, in the optimum all budget constraints will be
saturated. Therefore, the value function of a parent h who makes the migration decision
m is
V (m, θm, em, h) = ln (ym − θm) + γ
³
ln [θm + (1− em)ωk] + β ln
h
λemehi + εhi´ . (III.16)
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His/her decision problem thus is:
max
hm,θm,emi
V (m, θm, em, h)
Second, each parent chooses employment location,m, by anticipating the consequences this
choice will have on his/her child’s education and the intra-family remittances. Therefore,
a forward-looking parent first determine his/her child’s education level, em, and the intra-
family remittance flow, θm, given his/her migration decision,m. Then, given (em, θm), (s)he
optimally selects the localization that yields the highest possible value. More formally, each
parent’s two stages problem is described as follows:
max
½
max
θN ,eN
V (N, θN , eN , h);max
θS ,eS
V (S, θS, eS, h)
¾
(III.17)
D.1. Remittance Flows and Child’s Education Level
In this sub-section, we solve the second stage of the parent’s problem (III.17), conditional
upon his/her migration decision, m. We determine the optimal child’s education level (em)
and the optimal remittance flow (θm). Using (III.16).
Given (h,m), consider the maximization problem:
max
θm,em
V (m, θm, em, h), m ∈ {N,S}
The first order necessary and suﬃcient condition for an interior solution to this problem
leads to:
θm =
1
δ
∙
(1 + β) γym −
µ
1 + ε h
λehi
¶
ωk
¸
(III.18)
e∗m =
1
δ
∙µ
1 +
ym
ωk
¶
γβ − ε (1 + γ) h
λehi
¸
(III.19)
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where δ = 1 + (1 + β) γ, and
ym =
⎧
⎨
⎩
h− ϕi (h,Ei) if m = N
h if m = S
. (III.20)
Therefore, the following Propositions obtain by inspection of (III.18) and (III.19):
Proposition 1. If
yN > yS, (III.21)
then a parent remits more too his/her child dependent when (s)he migrates than when
(s)he does not (i.e., θN > θS), and, consequently, his/her child attains a higher level of
education in the first case than in the second (i.e., eN > eS).
Condition (III.21) means that a parent earns more when (s)he emigrates than when
(s)he does not. Proposition 1 resonates with earlier empirical findings about the positive
eﬀects of emigration and remittance flows on children’s education attainments in Mexico
(Hanson and Woodruﬀ, 2003).
Proposition 2. The quality of education in South has a positive eﬀect on the levels of
both intra-family remittance flows and child’s education attainment. In contrast, children’s
earning capacity as measured by the child labor wage ωk has a negative eﬀect on the levels
of both intra-family remittance flows and child’s education attainment.
These results are standard in the literature of parental investment in child human
capital. In particular, a higher quality education tends to raise the return to education.
This, in turn, incites an altruistic parent to make the sacrifice needed to ensure a better
future for his/her child. In this environment, this means (s)he remits more whatever his/her
location. Furthermore, when children have a high earning capacity, the opportunity cost
of education rises. Standard human capital theory (Becker, 1964) predicts that a high
opportunity cost of education discourages investment in human capital. In that context,
even altruistic parents will reduce their remittances, thus shifting child’s time use away
from schooling and into child labor.
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D.2. The Determinants of the Migration Decision
We stated above that a parent migration decision is binary: either (s)he stays and works
in South (m = 0), or (s)he emigrates to North (m = 1). The objective of this subsec-
tion is to uncover the determinants of the decision to migrate. Let ϑi
³
h, φ, b,ehi, Ei´ =
V (N, θ∗N , e∗N , h) − V (S, θ∗S, e∗S, h) denote the net value gain from migration, for a parent
with human capital level h, when immigration policy in North is i ∈ {1, 2}. From (III.16),
substituting in (III.18) and (III.19), using (III.7), (III.9), (III.12), and (III.15), and re-
arranging terms yields this net value gain as follows:
ϑi
³
h, φ, b,ehi, Ei´ = δ ln
⎡
⎣
[h− ϕi (h,Ei)]λehi + ³λehi + εh´φ
(1− b)hλehi + ³λehi + εh´φ
⎤
⎦ . (III.22)
The following Proposition therefore obtains from straightforward diﬀerentiation of (III.22).
Proposition 3. The following statements are all true:
(i) poverty in South (i.e., a high b) raises the gain from migration;
(ii) a high number of migrants (i.e., a high Ei) reduces the gain from migration;
(iii) If (III.21) holds, then a high education quality in South (i.e., a high ehi) encourages
migration, while a high child labor wage (i.e., a high φ) discourages it.
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 imply that diﬀerential earning prospects in North and South
provide parents in South with the incentive to work abroad. As immigration policy at the
destination country aﬀects these earning diﬀerentials, it has an eﬀect on the volume of
remittance flows (Proposition 1), but also, as we show below, on the quality of education
in South ehi. Before we turn to the discussion of the growth eﬀects of migration and
remittances, we first characterize the human capital profile of migrants, by relating it to
the immigration policy at North.
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E. Who Gains from Emigration?
In this sub-section, we explore the sources of diﬀerential gains from emigration among
parents. How does parental human capital aﬀect the gain from emigration?
Using (III.2), we can rewrite (III.22) as follows:
ϑ1
³
h;φ, b,eh1, E1´ = δ ln
⎡
⎣
[h− α1E1 − κ1]λeh1 + ³λeh1 + εh´φ
(1− b)hλeh1 + ³λeh1 + εh´φ
⎤
⎦ , (III.23)
if immigration policy i = 1 occurs in North, and
ϑ2
³
h;φ, b,eh2, E2´ = δ ln
⎡
⎣
(1− α2E2 − κ2h)hλeh2 + ³λeh2 + εh´φ
(1− b)hλeh2 + ³λeh2 + εh´φ
⎤
⎦ , (III.24)
if i = 2 occurs instead. The following Lemma is proved in the Appendix section.
Lemma 1. ∂ϑ1 (.) /∂h > 0. Furthermore, if
η > 1
2κ2
(III.25)
then ∂ϑ2 (.) /∂h < 0.
Lemma 1 above states that, when immigration policy in North is i = 1, the gain from
emigration is increasing in the migrant’s level of human capital (i.e., ∂ϑ1/∂h > 0). As a
result, parents who gain from emigrating (in total number E1) are those who have levels
of human capital above a threshold bh1, while those who lose, and thus will choose not
to emigrate (in total number 1 − E1) have levels of human capital no higher than that
threshold, where bh1 is solution to
ϑ1
³
h;φ, b,eh1, E1´ = 0. (III.26)
By contrast, when immigration policy in North is i = 2, and condition (III.25) holds, the
gain from emigration is decreasing in the migrant’s level of human capital (i.e., ∂ϑ2/∂h <
15
0). As a result, parents who gain from emigrating are those with a level of human capital
no higher than a threshold bh2, where bh2 is solution to
ϑ2
³
h;φ, b,eh2, E2´ = 0. (III.27)
Condition condition (III.25) imposes a lower bound for parental human capital h. This
condition is always easily satisfied for any κ2 ≥ 1.
Recall that parents are assumed to be uniformly distributed across human capital levels.
Using (III.1), it can be shown that the pattern of emigration induced by immigration policy
in North can be characterized as follows:
Ei =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1− bh1/η¯ i = 1bh2/η¯ i = 2 . (III.28)
These patterns of emigration have the following implications for respectively the quality of
education in South and the aggregate stock of human capital of non-emigrants:
Result 1. The quality of education in South—as proxied by the average human capital
level of non-emigrants— is given by
ehi =
⎧
⎨
⎩
³bh1 + η´ /2 i = 1³bh2 + η¯´ /2 i = 1 . (III.29)
Observe from (III.28) that an increase in the level of the threshold bh1 reduces the
number of Emigrants (i.e., ∂E1/∂bh1 < 0). Therefore from (III.29), it follows that the
quality of education in South eh1 is negatively impacted by a "brain drain": ∂eh1/∂bh1 > 0.
Likewise since from (III.28), an increase in the level of the threshold bh2 raises the number
of emigrants (i.e., ∂E2/∂bh2 > 0), it follows from (III.29) that emigration of workers with
low levels of human capital raises the quality of education in South : ∂eh2/∂bh2 > 0. This
surprising result can be explained as follows. Since teachers are hired from the pool of
non-emigrant parents, their average human capital rises as agents with low levels of human
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capital exit that pool. As a result, the quality of education increases.
Result 2. The aggregate human capital of non-emigrants is given by:
Hi =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∙³bh1´2 − η2¸ /2∆h i = 1
∙
η¯2 −
³bh2´2¸ /2∆h i = 2
. (III.30)
This result implies that emigration always reduces the production capacity of the
sending-country, irrespective of the human capital profile of emigrants as determined by
immigration policy at destination: ∂H1/∂bh1 > 0 if i = 1, and ∂H2/∂bh2 < 0 if i = 2.
IV. Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we define and characterize the existence of a general equilibrium for the
South’s economy, distinguishing between each of the two immigration policy scenario out-
lined above.
Définition An equilibrium for this overlapping-generations’ economy is a threshold human
capital endowment bh∗i , a law of motion for the economy-wide average human capital,
h¯0i, the quality of education in South eh∗i , and a number of emigrants, E∗i , such that
(i) given
³
E∗i ,eh∗i´, bh∗i solves
ϑi
³
h;φ, b,eh∗i , E∗i ´ = 0, (IV.1)
i = 1, 2;
(ii) given bh∗i , the number of emigrant E∗i is given by:
E∗i =
⎧
⎨
⎩
³
η¯ − bh∗1´ /∆h i = 1³bh∗2 − η´ /∆h i = 2 , (IV.2)
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and the quality of education in South eh∗i solves (III.29);
(iii) given
³bh∗i , E∗i ,eh∗i´ , the law of motion for the average level of human capital of
South’s parent citizens satisfies:
h¯0i = λeh∗i
"Z
DiS
e∗Sψ(h)dh+
Z
DiN
e∗Nψ(h)dh
#
+ εh¯, (IV.3)
where e∗m is given by (III.19) and
h¯ =
Z η¯
η
hψ (h) dh
denotes the economy-wide average human capital of the current generation of parents
in the absence of migrations.12
A. Equilibrium Values for Endogenous Variables
On the basis of this definition, it is clear that an equilibrium exists if and only if there
exists bh∗i that solves (III.27), for all i. We characterize this equilibrium in what follows.
We begin with the computation of equilibrium values for the thresholds bh∗1 and bh∗2. From
(III.27), substituting in (III.23) and (III.24), respectively and solving for bhi yields
bhi =
⎧
⎨
⎩
[α1E∗1 + κ1] b−1 i = 1
[1− α2E∗2 − (1− b)]κ−12 i = 2
. (IV.4)
Substituting these values in (IV.2), rearranging terms yields
E∗i =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(η¯b− κ1) [α1 + b∆h]−1 i = 1¡
b− ηκ2
¢
[α2 + κ2∆h]−1 i = 2
. (IV.5)
Suﬃcient conditions for E∗i to be well-defined are as follows:
κ1 ≤ bη¯; (IV.6)
12Note that h¯i 6= eh∗i .
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κ2η ≤ b, (IV.7)
bη − κ1 ≤ α1 (IV.8)
b ≤ α2 + κ2η¯. (IV.9)
Conditions (IV.6)-(IV.9) ensure that E∗i ∈ [0, 1] for all i = 1, 2. As we interpret b as
a measure of poverty in South, it follows from (IV.5) that poverty encourages emigra-
tion: ∂E∗i /∂b > 0. Substituting (IV.5) back into (IV.4) yields the respective equilibrium
threshold human capital levels as follows:
bh∗i =
⎧
⎨
⎩
[α1 + b∆h]−1 (α1 + κ1)∆h i = 1¡
b∆h + α2η
¢
[α2 + κ2∆h]−1 i = 2
. (IV.10)
The thresholds bh∗i are useful for characterizing the quality of education in South under
the two alternative immigration policy scenarios in North. We provide the proof of the
following Lemma in the Appendix section.
Lemma 2. Given the immigration policy i practiced by North, the equilibrium quality of
education in South is given by
eh∗i =
⎧
⎨
⎩
£
(α1 + κ1)∆h + η (α1 + b∆h)
¤
[2 (α1 + b∆h)]−1 i = 1£
(b+ κ2η¯)∆h + α2
¡
η¯ + η
¢¤
[2 (α2 + κ2∆h)]−1 i = 2
. (IV.11)
Lemma 2 implies that in the presence of migration, poverty in the migrant-sending
country causes a decline in the quality of education children receive, only when immigration
policy at the destination country favors a "brain drain": ∂eh∗1/∂b < 0 if i = 1 but ∂eh∗2/∂b >
0, if i = 2. This is because we measure the quality of education in South by the average
human capital of non-emigrants, accounting for the fact that teachers are recruiting among
these only.
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B. Migration and growth
In this sub-section, we analyze, the impact of migration and remittances on economic
growth in South. As human capital is the only engine of growth in this environment, we
define economic growth as a long-run variation in the average human capital of all South’s
agents (both emigrants and non-emigrants):
gi = h¯
0
i
h¯
,
where
h¯0i =
Z η¯
η
h
λeeh+ εhiψ (h) dh
is as defined in (IV.3), and
h¯ =
Z η¯
η
hψ (h) dh.
Indeed, using (IV.3), we obtain that the growth rate of average human capital in South is
given by gi = χi (b;κi, αi) where
χi (b;κi, αi) =
"Z
DiS
e∗Sψ(h)dh+
Z
DiN
e∗Nψ(h)dh
#
λeh∗i
h¯
+ ε (IV.12)
and
e∗N =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(φ+ h− α1E∗1 − κ1) γβ (δφ)
−1 − ε (1 + γ)
³
δλeh1´−1 h i = 1
(φ+ [1− α2E∗2 − κ2h]h) γβ (δφ)
−1 − ε (1 + γ)
³
δλeh2´−1 h i = 2
e∗S =
⎧
⎨
⎩
[φ+ (1− b)h] γβ (δφ)−1 − ε (1 + γ)
³
δλeh1´−1 h i = 1
[φ+ (1− b)h] γβ (δφ)−1 − ε (1 + γ)
³
δλeh2´−1 h i = 2 .
Given the complexity of the terms e∗N and e∗S, as a function of b— the poverty level in
South—, χi (b;κi, αi) may exhibit a high degree of non-linearity.
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C. Growth with No-Migration
In this sub-section, we characterize the growth rate of the South’s economy in the absence
of migration and trade. Denote the no-migration growth rate of average human capital in
South as
g0 = h¯
00
h¯
where
h¯00 =
Z η¯
η
h00ψ (h) dh,
describes the law of motion for the economy-wide average human capital, h00 = λe∗Seh0+ εh
the human capital of a child whose parent has a level of human capital h, eh0 = h¯ the
quality of education in South in the absence of migration, and
e∗S = δ−1
h
[φ+ (1− b)h] γβφ−1 − ε (1 + γ)h
¡
λh¯
¢−1i
the time allocated to child’s schooling by a parent with human capital level h. By substi-
tution, we have that
h¯00 = δ−1
£
φ+ (1− b) h¯
¤
γβφ−1λ− δ−1ε (1 + γ) h¯+ εh¯.
Therefore we obtain the no-migration growth rate g0 = χ0 (b) as follows
χ0 (b) = δ−1γβφ−1λ
£
φ+ (1− b) h¯
¤
− ε (1 + γ) δ−1 + ε (IV.13)
where
h¯ =
Z η¯
η
hψ (h) dh.
We use (IV.13) as a benchmark for contrasting the growth performance of the migrant-
sending economy under alternative immigration policies at the destination economy. Since
the expression (IV.12) representing the growth rate exhibits a high degree of non-linearity
as a function of b, we simulate the model numerically using parameters values set a the
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literature standards.
D. Immigration Policy, Remittances and Growth: A Numerical Simulation
How does immigration policy aﬀect the growth eﬀects of migration and remittances? We
address this question in this sub-section. Our strategy is to compare the average human
capital growth rate of South’s citizens (including both emigrants and non-emigrants) with
the growth rate that would have obtained in the absence of migration and trade. In other
words, we take the no-migration growth rate of average human capital as the benchmark.
We start by assigning numerical values for relevant parameters. According to Le et
al. (2005)13 educational measures are the best proxies for human capital. Krueger and
Lindahl (2001), Cohen and Soto (2001), De la Fuente and Doménech (2000), Wolﬀ (2000),
and Temple (1999) all used years of schooling as the most common proxy for human capital.
Barro and Lee (2001) estimate that the average number of years of schooling in 2000, for
developing countries is 4.89. Hence we set the maximum value of human capital η¯ at 9.23,
and the minimum value at η = 0.55. The altruism parameter γ is taken from de la Croix
and Doepke (2004) and set at γ = 0.169. As in Caucutt and Kumar (2007) we assume
that the model period is 20 years: individuals are born at age 6 and become parents at
the age of 26, have a child, and exit the workforce at the age of 45. The inter-generational
discount factor thus is set at β = 0.667, which corresponds to a yearly discount factor of
0.98 compounded over 20 years. We set the share of human capital inheritance (ε) at 0.175.
The eﬃciency of education (λ) is chosen such that the minimum growth rate of the poorest
country—understood as the country with the highest level for b— is equal to 1, in the absence
of migration. Total factor productivity in the informal sector (φ) is chosen such that the
demand for education of the richer parent is positive but less than 1 (i.e., eS (η¯) < 1).
Therefore we set φ = 0.15 and λ = 1.223. Theory puts no value on α1, α2, κ1 and κ2.
Therefore we adopt the following value assignment rule: the parameters κ1 and α1 are
chosen such that conditions (IV.6) and (IV.8) are simultaneously satisfied. The parameter
13Trinh Le, John Gibson and Les Oxley,"Measures of Human Capital: A Review of the Literature".
New Zealend Treasury, Working Paper 05/10, November 2005.
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κ2 and α2 are chosen such that (III.25), (IV.7) and (IV.9) are simultaneously satisfied.
This implies that the closed interval from which the values for the poverty measure b are
chosen satisfies conditions (IV.7) and (IV.9). Therefore b ∈ [0.55, 0.75]. Table 1 below
recapitulates the values assigned to the relevant parameters.
Table 1: Parameters of the model
η¯ η ε γ β λ φ κ1 α1 κ2 α2
9.23 0.55 0.175 0.169 0.667 1.223 0.15 4.34 10 1 0.05
We use these parameters values to compute (IV.12) and (IV.13).
Figure 1 below plots g1 = χ1 (b;κ1, α1) and g0 = χ0 (b) against b, where g1 denotes the
growth rate of average human capital in South when immigration policy practices in North
are biased towards the more-educated (i.e., Brain drain).
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Fig. 1. Growth eﬀect of a "brain drain"
The higher b the poorer the sending country. Figure 1 shows the growth rate in the
migrant-sending economy to be consistently lower than the benchmark. It implies that
despite emigrants’ remittances to their families, a "brain drain" has an adverse eﬀect on
the sending country’s growth. We explain this result by the fact that a "brain drain" causes
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a decline in the quality of education of the sending country, which in turn discourages
investment in human capital.
Figure 2 below plots g2 = χ2 (b;κ2, α2) against g0 = χ0 (b), where g2 denotes the growth
rate of average human capital in South when immigration policy practices in North are
biased towards the less-educated (Case 2).
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
b
Ec
on
om
ic
 g
ro
w
th
Benchmark
Case 2 (Emigration of less educated)
Fig. 2. Growth eﬀects of emigration of low-human capital workers
Figure 2 shows that when immigration policy at the destination country is biased towards
the less-educated, growth in the migrant-sending country is no lower than the benchmark,
and even exceeds this benchmark when the sending country is suﬃciently poor. We explain
this result by the fact that, unlike a "brain drain", emigration of the less-educated does
not cause a decline in the quality of education of the sending-country. Consequently,
remittances have a positive eﬀect on growth compared to the benchmark, when the sending-
country is suﬃciently poor.
Figures 1 and 2 taken together show that the growth eﬀects of migration and remit-
tances are entirely mediated by the immigration policy at the destination country. An
immigration policy that provokes a "brain drain" leaves the sending country worse oﬀ in
terms of growth performance. In contrast, when immigration policy target less-educated
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migrants, there are beneficial growth eﬀects in the sending country.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have established a relationship between migration, remittance flows and
economic growth in the migrant-sending country. In our model, parents remit to their
children in order to shift child’s time use away from child labor, and towards human
capital-enhancing education. The quality of education is impacted by the level of the
average economy-wide human capital of non-emigrant parents, as teachers are hired among
parents agents whose human capital is already formed. Our theory confirms the predictions
of existing theories that transnational migration and remittances have a positive eﬀect on
school-enrolment. It also predicts that remittances have a negative eﬀect on child labor.
However, unlike the existing literature, our theory predicts that the net gain to the sending-
country from emigration and remittance flows varies with the education (or human capital)
profile of emigrants, as determined by immigration policy at the destination country. A
"brain drain" leaves the sending country worse oﬀ, despite remittances, while emigration
of the less-educated makes it better oﬀ. We explain these diﬀerential eﬀects of migration
and remittance flows by the fact that, unlike the emigration of the less-educated, a "brain
drain" causes a decline in the quality of education of the sending country. For altruistic
parents, the decline in education quality raises the opportunity cost of school-enrolment
for children in an environment where schooling and child labor have competing claims on a
child’s time. Consequently, parents end up investing less in their children’s human capital
formation, and growth of the economy-wide average human capital is adversely aﬀected.
Our theory also suggests that an immigration policy biased in favor of less-educated
migrants is more eﬀective in combatting child labor in the sending-country than one that
encourages a "brain drain". It therefore has important implications for increasing calls
for rich countries to use their immigration policy as a development assistance tool (Ka-
pur, 2004). These calls have particularly intensified following the controversy surrounding
foreign aid as a development tool, suggesting that remittance flows can substitute for inef-
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fective foreign aid as a solution to the long-term prosperity of poor countries. Our theory
therefore can be interpreted as sending a warning to rich countries that not all patterns
of migration have beneficial eﬀects for migrant-sending countries. In particular, the grow-
ing practice among rich countries of selecting highly-educated foreign migrants (Docquier
and Marfouk, 2006) may be harmful to poor countries, despite oﬀering better prospects
for transnational remittance inflows. A shift of immigration policy toward targeting low-
human capital migrants say, on a seasonal basis, may have a more promising eﬀect on poor,
migrant-sending countries.
VI. Appendix
In this section we provide the proofs of results stated in the main text.
A. Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of Lemma 1 follows in two steps. First, we establish the first claim: ∂ϑ1 (.) /∂h >
0. Let us re-write (III.23) as follows:
ϑ1
³
h;φ, b,eh1, E1´ = δ lnΥ (h)
where
Υ (h) = [h− αE1 − κ1] + χ (h)
(1− b)h+ χ (h)
χ (h) =
³
λeh1 + εh´³λeh1´−1 φ.
Therefore we know that
∂ϑ1
∂h = δ
Υ0 (h)
Υ (h)
where
Υ0 (h) = N1 (h)
[(1− b)h+ χ (h)]2
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and
N1 (h) = [χ0 (h) + 1] (1− b)h+
h
λeh1 + (α1E1 + κ1) εiφ³λeh1´−1 > 0.
Since Υ (h) > 0, this establishes the claim.
Next, we establish the second claim: ∂ϑ2 (.) /∂h < 0 if condition (III.25) holds. As in
the first claim, we can re-write (III.24) as follows:
ϑ2
³
h;φ, b,eh2, E2´ = δ lnΓ (h)
where
Γ (h) =
⎡
⎣
(1− α2E2 − κ2) + φh−1 + f
³eh2´
(1− b) + φh−1 + f
³eh2´
⎤
⎦ ,
f
³eh2´ = εφ
λeh2 .
Therefore, we know that
∂ϑ2
∂h =
δN2 (h)h
(1− b) + φh−1 + f
³eh2´i2 Γ (h) ,
where
N2 (h) = −
£
φh−2 + κ2
¤
(1− b)− κ2
h
f
³eh2´+ φh−1i+ (1− α2E2 − κ2h)φh−2.
To show that ∂ϑ2/∂h < 0, it then suﬃces to show that N2 (h) < 0. Indeed N2 (h) can be
re-written as follows:
N2 (h) = −
£
φh−2 + κ2
¤
(1− b)− κ2f
³eh2´− φh−2 [2κ2h− 1 + α2E2] ,
which is clearly negative, whenever condition (III.25) holds. This completes the proof.
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B. Proof of Lemma 2
Observe that by definition, the average level of human capital of non-emigrants in South
is given by: eh∗i = 11−E∗i H∗i
where
H∗i =
Z
Di∗S
hψ (h) dh
denotes the aggregate stock of human capital of non-emigrants, and
Di∗S =
⎧
⎨
⎩
hbh∗1, η¯i i = 1h
η,bh∗2i i = 2
is the set from which non-emigrants draw their human capital levels when immigration
policy at destination is i = 1, 2. Therefore, using the definition of ψ (h), we obtain H∗i as
follows
H∗i =
⎧
⎨
⎩
³bh∗1 + η´ (1−E∗1) /2 i = 1³bh∗2 + η¯´ (1−E∗2) /2 i = 2 .
Substituting (IV.5) and (IV.10) yields the result.
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